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1. Introduction: The State and Islamic Economy Project
According to Zeti Akhtar Aziz, the Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, Islamic Finance 
is among the fastest growing segments in the global financial system.１） According to The 
Banker, sharia-compliant assets had crossed the $1,000 billion milestone in 2011 and are 
still growing.２） Global Islamic banking assets have grown from $145 billion in 2002 to 
$1,086 billion in 2011. Furthermore, the Islamic banking and finance industry is expected 
to record a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15% to 20% until 2015.３）
Despite the negative image of Islam in the Western Hemisphere after the 9/11 tragedy, 
Islamic banking and finance continue to grow in the West as an alternative to interest 
based finance.４） In 2010, total assets of Islamic banking and finance industry in Europe, 
North America, and Australia reached 42,729.5 Million USD, doubled from 21,475.7 
Million USD in 2007.５）
This development is a symptom of a broader trend. After the First International 
Conference on Islamic Economics in Mecca (1976), literatures on ‘Islamic economics’ had 
been published and the new discipline of ‘Islamic economics’ was introduced. Other related 
developments are the ongoing attempts to advocate Zakat (Islamic religious alms) as a 
redistribution policy in many countries in order to complement or even replace taxation. 
All these developments could be understood as parts of the ‘Islamic economy project,’ a 
project to Islamize the economic system.
1.1. Why Indonesia’s Case is Important
The Politics of Islamic Finance (2004), edited by Clement M. Henry and Rodney 
Wilson, collected articles from scholars related to ‘the politics conditioning and sometimes 
enveloping Islamic financial institutions.’ ６） Within this volume, several articles discussed 
case studies of several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Some 
case studies briefly mentioned the discussion about states’ responses to Islamic economy 
project.
In his work on Tunisia’s Islamic Bank, Robert P. Parks noted that the development of 
Tunisia’s Islamic bank was closely related to the response of Tunisia’s ruling authoritarian 
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government. The state was dominating the banking system and was eager to maintain that 
control. Thus, the regime contained the development of Islamic banking due to the 
suspicion of political vision of Islamic banking and finance and the fear that Islamic 
banking will create and autonomous private banking sector.７）
Another work on the relationship between state and Islamic economy project was 
provided by Sherin Galal Abdullah Mouawad. In this article, Mouawad discussed the 
responses of the Egyptian government towards the development of Islamic financial 
institutions since 1963 until 2007. It concluded that the Egyptian government had 
restrained the growth of Islamic banking and finance through its policies and their 
manipulation over the legal, economic and religious institutions. This response is due to 
the regime’s willingness to maintain the stability of its economic system and the suspicion 
of the link between Islamic banking and finance and the country’s Islamic political 
movement.８）
While Ibrahim Warde argued that modern Islamic Finance is by and large “a creation 
of the Arab World”,９） the growth of Islamic economy movement is not confined in that 
particular region. This paper is aiming to give a new insight by looking closer at how the 
Indonesian state is responding to the Islamic economy movement since its inception in 
1980s.
The case of Indonesia is also unique because Islamic economy movement had been 
growing in a changing environment. During the early period of the Islamic economy project 
in 1980s, Indonesia was in the era of an authoritarian regime which staunchly oppressed 
Islamic movements. In 1990s, Indonesia was still under the same regime but with a 
completely different attitude. In the late 1980s, President Suharto started to question the 
loyalty of top military leaders.10） The long time pillar of the regime’s power was cracked. 
Following the break up, Suharto went closer to Muslim groups. Many observers believed 
that Suharto’s move was political as he attempted to reach Muslim groups in order to 
embrace a new ally to sustain and strengthen his regime.
Another seismic change happened in 1998, following the Asian Crisis that had shaken 
Indonesia’s economy. The crisis and the economic hardship that it brought had given 
momentum for popular protests calling for democratization and the ending of Suharto’s 
rule under the battle cry of “Reformasi” (“Reform”). Finally, the President declared his 
resignation in May 1998. Since 1998, Indonesia was undergoing a democratic transition 
where the citizens, including Muslim groups, relatively free to express their identity and 
ideas.
1.2. Research Question
This paper is aiming to understand how the Indonesian state, within the evolving 
political context, had responded to the Islamic economy project. It especially focuses on the 
responses of the Indonesian Central Bank (Bank Indonesia), an important state institution 
which is the highest authority in regulating the Indonesian banking and financial system, 
towards one core of Islamic economy project, namely the Islamic banking and finance. It 
tries to explain the dynamics behind such responses, including by understanding the key 
factors and the key actors (and their motivations) in the policy making processes.
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2. Evolving Context
Despite its status as the most populous Muslim country, Indonesia is a latecomer in 
the development of Islamic economy project.  Globally, Islamic banking and finance started 
to grow with the establishment of Islamic Development Bank in 1973. The establishment 
of IDB spurred the growth of Islamic banking and finance in various countries, such as 
Dubai Islamic Bank (1975), Islamic Commercial Bank of Abu Dhabi (1977), and Faisal 
Islamic Banks (1977). In the neighboring Malaysia, Darul Mal al-Islami (DMI) was 
established in 1981. Indonesia’s first Islamic bank only appeared 10 years later in 1991 
and started to operate in 1992.
In 1976, A.M. Saefuddin, who played significant role in the birth of Islamic economy 
movement in Indonesia in 1980s,11） went to the 1st International Conference on Islamic 
Economics in Mecca. In 1980s, A.M. Saefuddin and other figures started to openly call for 
the Islamization of the economy. The movement grew and a national symposium on Islamic 
economics was held in Bandung Islamic University (UNISBA) in 1983, initiated by ITB’s 
SALMAN activists. The event was held in UNISBA because the rector, Professor Muttaqin, 
was very supportive to the idea of Islamic economy. Following the Bandung Conference, 
experiments to put the ideas of Islamic economy was put into practices. A group of students 
established Baitut-Tamwil (“House of Finance”) Teknosa SALMAN in 1984. This 
institution operated based on the principles of Islamic banking and finance.
Despite this development, the impact and scale of Islamic economy project was still 
very limited. There was no formal Islamic banking or financial institution at the national 
level which was officially accommodated in the national banking system. The banking 
regulation (1967 Law on Banking) did not give any room for the establishment of any non-
interest banking institution. The state was not supportive towards the idea of Islamic 
economy project.
2.1. “Muslim-Unfriendly” Authoritarian Regime (1980s)
In 1970s and 1980s, Suharto’s regime was an “unfriendly” authoritarian regime for 
Muslim groups. The use of the world “unfriendly” and “friendly” might be confusing for 
some because it is a common sense that an authoritarian regime is “unfriendly.” However, I 
insist to use the term to illustrate the significant change in the attitudes of the regime 
towards Muslim groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, Suharto was oppressive towards Muslim 
groups and aspirations. Following a political shift in late 1980s, Suharto started to 
accomodate Muslim groups and aspirations  (in other words: becoming “Muslim-friendly”).
As many observers had noted, one core of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ was the prioritization 
of economic development. After the turbulent economic situation in Sukarno’s leadership, 
Suharto relied to a handful of economists to rebuild the economy. To make sure that the 
economic development is going well as planned, the regime ensuring political stability by 
any means necessary, including political repressions and even violence.12）
For a regime that put economic growth and stability as one of the most important 
priority (and even kept with violence if necessary), the idea of changing or reforming the 
economic system was of course threatening. Furthermore, the idea also came with a 
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suspicious ‘Islamic ’ label and supported by Muslim groups, many of them were 
sympathizers of Political Islam.
Of course, Islamic movements were not the only ones repressed. One should note that 
Suharto was not friendly to any potential oppositions, be it from the ‘right’ (Political Islam, 
ekstrim kanan), ‘left’ (Communists, ekstrim kiri), or from the ‘middle’ (liberal democrats, 
ekstrim tengah).13） The regime forced Islamic parties to merge into a single party (1973),14） 
pushed a national marriage bill in order to ‘unify’ Indonesian marriage Law (1973),15） 
established MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars) for 
giving religious decrees (fatwa) in support of its ‘development policies’,16） put Penataran 
Pancasila (‘Pancasila Training’) as an obligatory subject in the school curriculum (1978), 
and even waged military crackdowns (1976, 1981, 1984).
Within this context, Indonesia’s Islamic economy movement was born. In its early 
development, the state was not supportive. Some ‘warnings’ were issued against its 
proponents such as A.M. Saefuddin.17） However, the government was not seeing this 
movement as a serious threat and thus allowed it to grow little by little, probably because 
the movement itself was cautiously distinct itself from Political Islam. Nevertheless, at this 
period, the government did not give room in the national banking and financial system to 
Islamic-economy-based institutions, such as Islamic banks.
2.2. “Muslim-Friendly” Authoritarian Regime (Late 1980s-1998)
Since late 1980s, the political environment changed. In the late 1980s, the President 
found that the military top brass leaders were unhappy with the growing influence of 
Suharto’s sons and daughters in the business sector and started to doubt their loyalty. 
Suharto, and thus the government, was becoming friendlier towards Muslim groups.18） In a 
high profile event in 1990, President Suharto opened the first meeting of the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI). The 
influence of ICMI was also growing politically, with many ICMI-affiliated figures appointed 
as top state officials and the ‘greenization’ (hijausasi) in the ruling Golkar party. 19） MUI, 
the corporatist body that was designed as a top-down channel to impose government 
policies, was getting more influential and transformed into a canal of aspiration for Muslim 
groups to push their agendas more assertively to the state.
In this new environment, the establishment of Indonesia’s first Islamic bank was 
planned and finally realized. Both ICMI and MUI played important roles in the process.
The idea of establishing the first Islamic bank in Indonesia was introduced by Amin 
Aziz in the discussions held by the MUI-affiliated Communication Forum for the 
Development of Indonesia (Forum Komunikasi Pembangunan Indonesia, FKPI).20） MUI 
finally organized Workshop on Bank and Interest was held in Safari Garden Hotel Cisarua, 
18-20 August 1990. Interestingly, one of its main sponsors was Humpuss Group, the 
company that was owned by the President’s own son, Hutomo Mandala Putra.21） To 
represent the government, officials from the Central Bank of Indonesia were also invited. 
The result of the workshop then brought to the Fourth National Summit of MUI in Sahid 
Jaya Hotel, Jakarta, 22-25 August 1990, which finally recommended the establishment of a 
working group named ‘MUI banking team’ (Tim Perbankan MUI ) to create an Islamic 
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bank in Indonesia.22）
The establishment of ICMI in 1990 had significantly helped the vision to materialize. 
ICMI was a strong and influential vehicle for Muslim groups because it was having 
Habibie, at the time was the Minister of Science and Technology, as its chairman. According 
many observers, Habibie was the most trusted aide of Suharto since late 1980s.23） Habibie 
himself took the establishment of Islamic bank as one of ICMI’s agenda. Habibie formed 
teams to prepare the establishment and asked Rachmat Saleh,24） a respected figure among 
the economists and former Governor of Indonesia’s Central Bank, as one of the leaders.25）
With the blessing of Suharto, Indonesia’s first Islamic bank was established on 1 
November 1991, using the name of Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI). The legal problem 
that the existing regulations on banking did not cover banks operating without interest 
was solved in 1992. Coincidentally, the government was on the process to amend the 
existing regulations on banking (i.e. 1967 Banking Law, the October Policy Package of 1988 
(Paket Kebijakan Oktober 1988 or Pakto 88) and January 1990 Package or Paket Kebijakan 
Januari 1990).26） With Suharto’s supportive stance to BMI, Islamic economy movement 
supporters were confident enough to start lobbies to include a clear legal basis for the 
operation of a bank operating without interest.
On 25 March 1992, the Law No. 7/1992 on Banking was issued. The new Law briefly 
mentioned about the permissibility of bank to provide services based on the principles of 
profit-sharing, providing a legal basis for the operation of BMI.27） Two months after, in May 
1992, BMI started to operate. On the following October, the government issued 
Government Regulation No. 72/1992 on Profit-sharing Based Bank (Peraturan Pemerintah 
No. 72/1992 tentang Bank dengan Berdasarkan Prinsip Bagi Hasil).
With the government’s welcoming stance, BMI found its place. In 1994, the Bank 
opened branch in Bandung, Surabaya, and Semarang.28） The Bandung branch grand 
opening was marked with a bedug ceremony led by the vice Governor of West Java 
Province, H.A.M Sampurna.29） The Surabaya Branch was opened by the Governor of East 
Java Province, Basofi Sudirman, who was also the first customer of the branch.30）
The success to establish Indonesia’s Islamic bank boosted other initiatives. In 1994, 
ICMI sponsored the establishment of 85 BMTs in Aceh and Lampung provinces.31） At the 
same year, Dompet Dhuafa (literally ‘The Poor’s Pocket’), a zakat management institution 
affiliated with Republika Daily which was affiliated to ICMI, launched the program to 
establish “1001 BMTs and Islamic Rural Banks” in Indonesia.32） Also in 1994, the first 
Islamic Insurance service in Indonesia, PT Asuransi Takaful Keluarga, was established.33） 
Study groups and academic institutions focusing on Islamic economics started to flourish.
2.3. Democracy (1999-recent)
The 1997 Asian Crisis was a blessing in disguise for Indonesia’s Islamic economy 
movement. It sparked political events which eventually lead to the resignation of Suharto 
and the rise of Habibie as the President. In his relatively short transitional period, another 
important tipping point happened for Islamic economy movement. At least there were 
three Laws that were significantly affecting the development of Islamic economy 
movement: Law no. 10/1998 on Banking, Law no. 23/1999 on Indonesia’s Central Bank 
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(Bank Indonesia) and Law no 38/1999 on Zakat.
The Law no. 10/1998 on Banking was issued to amend the 1992 Law on banking. In 
the revised Law, the term Islamic bank (“Bank Syariah”) was explicitly mentioned, 
providing a strong legal basis for the development of Islamic banking and finance. It also 
provided a legal basis for the expansion of services of Islamic banks, allowed the formerly 
prohibited dual banking system and allowed interest-based banks to have Islamic banking 
Units. Law no. 23/1999 on Indonesia’s Central Bank (Bank Indonesia) mentioned that the 
Central Banks’s monetary policies could include shari’a-based measures.
Another positive impact of the 1997 economic crisis was the growing attention of the 
BI to Islamic banking. BI established the team for the research and development of Islamic 
bank in Indonesia in 1999, which was the embryo of BI’s Directorate for Islamic Banking. 
With this establishment, BI positioned itself as an important actor in the development of 
Islamic banking industry. Following BI’s recommendation, new commercial banks were 
established. Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM) was founded on 8 September 1999 and started 
to operate on 1 November 1999.34） The establishment of BSM, owned by the powerful Bank 
Mandiri, marked the emergence of Islamic economy as an industry.
Before, the only Islamic commercial bank Indonesia was BMI (other Islamic ‘banks’ 
were small-sized Islamic rural banks), which was very much an idealist project 
accommodated by the state. After 1999, big money started to enter the arena for business 
purposes. For instance, in 2001 the Indonesian tycoon Chairul Tanjung bought PT Bank 
Umum Tugu and converted it into an Islamic bank named Bank Syariah Mega, started to 
operate in year 2004.35） The alumni of BMI, such as Adiwarman Karim and Syafii Antonio, 
played significant role by help many business actors to set up Islamic banks and other 
financial institutions.
During Yudhoyono’s presidency (2004-2009, 2009-now), several legislations that were 
advocated by the Islamic economy movement were issued. These Laws were including Law 
number 19/2008 on Sovereign Shari’a Securities (Surat Berharga Syariah Negara), a 
specific Law on Islamic banking which is the Law number 21/2008 on Islamic Banking, and 
Law Number 23/2011 on Zakat.
3. Bank Indonesia’s Early Involvement
The involvement of the BI on the Islamic economy project started in 1990s. When MUI 
held the Workshop on Bank and Interest in Cisarua, 18-20 August 1990, officials from the 
Central Bank of Indonesia were invited. The Governor of BI, Adrianus Mooy, was scheduled 
to give a presentation on the banking system and its implication for social welfare. 
However, he did not attend the event personally and thus his presentation was delivered 
by another official.36）
Following the workshop, there was no formal statement by the BI regarding the 
establishment of an Islamic bank in Indonesia. The central bank did not reject the idea but 
also promised nothing. The situation changed when Suharto openly declared his support 
for the establishment of the Islamic bank, even though the President asked that the word 
‘Islam’ should be dropped from the name of the Bank.
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Responding to this development, BI established a special team to assist the 
establishment of BMI. The BI team was led by Subarjo Joyosumarto and included Siti 
Fajriyah, Ramzi A. Zuhdi, and Muchtar Syafi’i.37） Most of the team had no idea on Islamic 
banking before, and thus started to learn from zero. This unfamiliarity did not stop them, 
even though some colleagues in the Central Bank often joked to them that BMI is the 
acronym for “Bank Mustahil Indonesia” (“Indonesia’s Impossible Bank”).38） BI also worked 
closely with a team which was formed by ICMI, led by Karnaen Perwataatmaja, an official 
at the Department of Finance who had an experience as an executive director at the 
Islamic Development Bank (1988-1989 and 1991-1992). Bank Indonesia also called other 
parties, including some major private banks such as Bank Niaga, to lend their hands.39） 
With the help from the BI team, BMI was finally established and started to operate in 
1992.
In this period, skepticism did face BI officials who participated in the establishment 
project. Many colleagues, including those in the higher rank of BI, doubted that Islamic 
banking will work in Indonesia. Many saw that the establishment of BMI was nothing 
more than a concession given by the regime to Muslim groups.40） Nevertheless, the idea of 
Islamic banking and finance promoted by Islamic economy movement had successfully 
reached the epicenter of state’s policy making process on monetary policies and on the 
banking and financial system.
A small but committed group of sympathizers for further development of Islamic 
economy project was informally formed within the Central Bank. Their close involvement 
in the hectic establishment of BMI made them personally connected to Islamic economy 
activists.
4. Following the Market or Actively Shaping the Market?
From 1992 to 1997, 75 Islamic rural banks were established, while BMI remained the 
only commercial bank operating by Islamic principles. Even though the 1992 Law on 
Banking did gave the legal basis for the operation of non-interest banks, many 
technicalities were conducted according the existing regulations on banking which were 
not always compatible with the operation of Islamic banking. Due to the small size, BI did 
not allocate specific unit to deal with Islamic banking.
Some officials did argue that rather than ‘following the market’ (BI should create a 
specific unit to deal with Islamic banking only if Islamic banking is growing to a certain 
size), BI should be actively shaping the market by proactively creating an environment 
which is supportive to the growth of Islamic banking. Harisman, the Head of Kuala 
Lumpur Office of BI (1994-1997), sent some papers on how BI could help to develop Islamic 
banking in Indonesia based on his observation to Malaysian practices. However, while his 
colleagues in BI’s central office did positively accept his papers, they “only put the papers 
as decorations.”41） “Fortunately”, according to Harisman, “the idea was captured by Mr. 
Subarjo Joyosumarto, who was a Deputy Governor at the time.” 42）
The 1997 Asian Crisis had shaken the Indonesian banking system. Responding to the 
crisis, the authorities took several intervening measures, including closures, take over, and 
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recapitalization of banks. Furthermore, the authorities introduced several reforms to 
ensure the emergence of a sound and efficient financial system. To enable it conducting an 
effective supervision to the banks, BI was granted an independent status from government 
intervention in the Law No. 23/1999 on Central Bank.
Within this wave of reforms, Islamic banking and finance was taken more seriously by 
the Central Bank. Even though it was not the main theme of the reform, Islamic banking 
was considered in line with banking restructuration measures taken by BI.43） The term 
‘Islamic banking’ (perbankan syari’ah) also appeared in the Law no.10/1998 on Banking. 
Law No. 23/1999 on Central Bank also stated that BI is eligible to take shari’a-based 
monetary policies. BI started to see that the development of Islamic banking, if managed 
properly, can be positively contributing to the emergence of a sound and efficient financial 
system.
Within its organization, BI established the team for the research and development of 
Islamic bank in Indonesia in 1999. With this establishment, BI positioned itself as an 
active actor in shaping the development of Islamic banking industry. The team was under 
the supervision of Harisman, who returned from Malaysia in 1997 and was a high ranking 
official in BI’s Bank Monitoring and Development Affairs Section (UPPB, Urusan 
Pengawasan dan Pembinaan Bank-Bank).
Furthermore, BI was deeply involved in the birth of the second Islamic commercial 
bank in Indonesia, Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM). In early 1999, Bank Susila Bhakti (BSB 
bank) was merged with several other crisis-affected banks. At around the same period, the 
government merged Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Exim, and Bapindo 
banks into a new bank named PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) on 31 July 1999. Following the 
establishment of PT Bank Mandiri, the new bank was granted the majority ownership of 
BSB. The BSB was then transformed into Bank Syariah Mandiri, founded on 8 September 
1999 and started to operate on 1 November 1999.44）
The growth of Islamic banking industry created the need for a specific unit dealing 
with Islamic banking. In May 2001, the Islamic banking bureau was established to further 
develop the sector. In 2002, BI issued a regulation on Islamic banking units through BI 
regulation No. 4/1/PBI/2002, which was significantly supporting the growth of Islamic 
banking in Indonesia by providing the legal basis for the conversion of conventional bank 
into Islamic bank, conversion from a branch of conventional bank into a branch of Islamic 
bank, conversion from a cash office of a conventional bank into a branch of Islamic bank, 
establishment of an Islamic sub-branch within a branch of a conventional bank, and 
establishment of Islamic banking unit within a branch of a conventional bank. Around two 
years later, the status of the bureau was elevated into a directorate.
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In 2002, BI published the Blueprint of Islamic Banking Development in Indonesia to 
provide the guidance for the stakeholders of Islamic banking and to set the position and 
vision of the Central Bank on the development of Islamic banking in Indonesia.46） In 2004, 
BI sponsored the establishment of the Center of Communication for Islamic Economy 
(Pusat Komunikasi Ekonomi Syariah, PKES) as part of its efforts to educate the public on 
Islamic banking and finance.
In 2004, BI introduced several strategic programs to further consolidate the national 
banking system, including the “single presence policy” that prohibits investors from 
holding more than 25% of the shares of more than one bank. Islamic economy movement 
activists and business actors saw this “single presence policy” as an opportunity. They 
lobbied BI to make a special case for Islamic banking. Investors are prohibited to hold 
ownership of more than one bank, except in the case where one bank is interest-based 
bank and the other one is an Islamic bank. BI agreed to this proposal, which lead to the 
birxcth of some new Islamic commercial banks.47）
On 2 July 2007, BI launched ‘iB’ (Ai Bi) as a common identity of Islamic banks.48） The 
fancy name, intentionally aimed at making the audience connect it with modern brands 
Table 1.  Chronological Development of the Directorate of Islamic Banking, 
Central Bank of Indonesia45)
Date Unit Dealing With Islamic 
Banking
Information
1992-1998 No specific unit Some officials were tasked for the 
Islamic banking.
1998-March 1999 Team for Research on Banking 
Management and Operations, 
Bureau for Banking Research, 
Bank Monitoring and Development 
Affairs 
Research and regulation for 
Islamic banking is part of the task 
of the team.
Status:  a team, but no specific 
unit
April-August 1999 Team for the Development of 
I s l a m i c  B a n k i n g ,  B a n k 
Monitoring and Development 
Affairs 
Status:  a specific unit under a 
bureau.
September 1999-May 2001 Team for the Development of 
Is lamic Banking, Bureau o f 
Banking Research, Directorate for 
Banking Research and Regulation 
Status:  a specific unit under a 
bureau.
31 May 2001-1 November 2003 Islamic Banking Bureau (Biro 
Perbankan Syariah, BPS)
A s  p a r t  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g 
reorganization measures, Islamic 
Banking Bureau (Biro Perbankan 
Syariah, BPS) was established.
Status: a bureau (staffed by < 30 
person)
1 November 2003-recent Directorate of Islamic Banking 
(DPbS)
Based on PDG No. 5/ /PDG dated 
23 October 2003, Directorate of 
Islamic Banking (DPbS) was 
established as a directorate.
Status:  a directorate (staffed by 
45-60 person)
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such as iPhone, iPod, ibank, was designed to familiarize public to Islamic banking 
services.49） In 2008, BI established the Islamic Banking Committee (Komite Perbankan 
Syariah) to assist BI to understand fatwa from MUI and translate it into BI regulations. In 
the same year, BI also launched the ‘Grand Strategy for Islamic Banking Market 
Development’, which stressed the importance of rebranding Islamic banking by focusing on 
its ‘substance’ rather than its ‘symbols’.50） Until today, BI is still actively involved in the 
development of Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia.
5. Understanding the Responses
In many occasions, Islamic economy activists praised BI’s role in the development of 
Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia. However, it would be misleading to say that BI 
is embracing the idea of Islamizing the economic system or the banking and financial 
system. While BI support to the development of Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia 
is real and significant, BI had its own views on Islamic banking and finance. Interestingly, 
by proactively supporting the growth of Islamic banking industry, BI acts as a moderating 
actor of the Islamic economy project in Indonesia.
5.1. Institutional Interest
Its initial involvement was merely a response to the demand from the society, which 
was strongly endorsed by President Suharto. However, this initial encounter had sparked 
the growth of interest in BI on Islamic banking and finance. Because the idea of Islamic 
economy or Islamic banking and finance was unfamiliar, BI inevitably requested the 
participation of many Islamic economy activists in the process of developing the regulatory 
environment that allow Indonesia’s first Islamic commercial bank to operate. To gain more 
insights, BI also learned from the practices of Islamic banking and finance abroad, 
including Singapore, London and New York.
Domestically, BI also conducted research to understand the views of Muslim 
communities in Indonesia towards interest. The research found that several Muslim 
communities in Muslim majority regions such as Java’s northern coast, Madura, and West 
Sumatra were avoiding bank services except in urgent matters. They also rejected to accept 
the interest from their savings, which in turn created accounting problems for the bank.51）
From this process, BI came into a view that rather than a threat to the banking 
system, Islamic banking could play a supportive role to strengthen the banking system. 
The availability of an alternative banking service which operates without interest, BI 
hoped that the banking system is going to be able to reach out a certain part of the 
population who see interest as usury and thus forbidden by the religion. More choices of 
banking services means wider mobilization of public fund. In its official website, BI stated:
“In view of providing a wider banking services alternative to Indonesian economy, the 
development of Islamic banking in Indonesia is implemented under dual banking 
system in compliance with the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API). Islamic 
banking and conventional banking systems jointly and harmoniously support a wider 
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public fund mobilization in the framework of fostering financing capability of national 
economic sectors.”52）
After the 1997 Crisis which had shaken the banking system, BI took Islamic banking 
more seriously. BI viewed Islamic banking in the context that diversification of the banking 
system is important for to strengthen its resilience. Furthermore, at least conceptually, 
Islamic banking is more connected to real economy and thus will contribute positively to 
the stability of the financial system.
This perception is evident in various documents of BI regarding Islamic banking in 
Indonesia. In its official website, BI stated:
“In the context of macroeconomic management, an extensive use of various Islamic 
financial products and instrument will help attaching financial sector and real sector 
and create harmonization between the two sectors. In addition to support financial and 
business the widely use of Islamic product and instrument will also reduce speculative 
transactions in thus the economy supports the stability of overall financial system. At 
the end, the Islamic banking will significantly contribute to the achievement of mid-
long term price stability.”53）
Thus, it could be argued that BI’s support to the development of Islamic banking in 
Indonesia was not ideologically driven. There is in no way that BI embraced Islamic 
economy movement’s idea of Islamization of the economic system. Instead, BI supported 
the development of Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia because BI see its benefit for 
BI’s institutional objective, which is “to achieve and maintain the stability of the Rupiah 
value,” which is related to monetary policies, payment system, and banking system.54）
5.2. Role of Individuals
But, how BI came into the view that Islamic banking will positively contribute to the 
stability of the banking system? The role of certain individuals did matter.
Some BI officials did play important roles to convince their colleague in the BI, and 
thus BI as an institution, that supporting the growth of Islamic banking and finance will 
be beneficial for the achievement of BI’s own institutional objective. One prominent figure 
is Subarjo Joyosumarto.
He is applauded by Islamic economy activists for his significant role in paving the way 
for Islamic banking through the bureaucracy of BI. He was the person in charge for 
assisting the creation of BMI in early 1990s. After 1998, he was also the person behind the 
birth of the team for the research and development of Islamic banking in BI. He was 
personally involved in various BI initiatives to develop Islamic banking, including 
socialization in universities and communities across the Indonesian archipelago. After 
PKES was established in 2004, he was at its helm as the chairman. Now, in his position the 
director of Indonesian Banking Development Institute (LPPI, Lembaga Pengembangan 
Perbankan Indonesia) continuously helped further development of Islamic banking and 
financial industry in Indonesia.55） With his role, LPPI established a Directorate of Islamic 
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Banking in 2004 which officially became the International Center for Development in 
Islamic Finance (ICDIF) in 2008.56）
The reason for his support was hardly ideological. According to some BI officials, 
Subarjo Joyosumarto was not coming from a santri (devout muslim) background, even 
though it was true that he was getting more religious since his encounter with Islamic 
banking and finance.57） With his many initiatives to support Islamic banking, he does not 
limit himself exclusively into it. He was appointed as Alternate Executive Director of IMF 
and the Executive Director of the South-East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research 
and Training Centre prior to his current position in LPPI. Currently, he also sits as a 
commissioner of the BTN (Bank Tabungan Negara).
The explanation for his support might be socially constructed. His encounter with 
Islamic economy activists in early 1990s and his close personal relationship with them 
after the establishment of BI is probably the main factors behind his support. As the 
person who was in charge for the banking liberalization project in 1980s, he was pretty 
much open minded to any possibility to strengthen the national banking system. His 
encounter with the idea of Islamic banking and finance and the fact that some Indonesian 
rejected interest made him convinced that Islamic banking and finance is an untapped 
potential in Indonesia.
Another important figure was Harisman, who was the Head of Kuala Lumpur Office of 
BI from 1994 until 1997. During his stay there, he observed the Malaysian practices of 
dual banking system and how the central bank plays a significant role in developing 
Islamic banking sector. 58） Based on his observation, he sent papers back to Indonesia, 
which will later became important sources for BI’s initiatives on Islamic banking. He 
recalled that his interest for Islamic banking was sparked since early 1990s, at the time 
when BMI was born. 59）
BI’s encounter with Islamic economy movement during the establishment of BMI in 
early 1990s was not only significant in terms of the birth of BMI itself, but also significant 
because this encounter had helped created a close personal relationship with many 
important BI officials that view Islamic banking positively. Most of BI officials who play 
important roles in the development of Islamic banking were among Joyosumarto’s team in 
early 1990s, such as Siti Fajriyah, Ramzi A. Zuhdi, and Muchtar Syafi’i.
5.3. Close Relationship with Islamic Economy Movement and Business Actors
BI’s Grand Strategy of Islamic Banking Market Development regarded the efforts to 
develop Islamic banking industry in Indonesia as a kind of “total football”. According to 
this grand strategy, BI should work together closely with activists, Islamic banks, and the 
academics.
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The relatively small size of the Islamic banking industry and the active role of BI to 
help develop the sector had made some BI officials were personally close to Islamic 
economy movement activists and business actors.61） This close relationship was started 
since the beginning, because BI had no idea of what is ‘Islamic banking’ before. Thus, BI 
officials, institutionally and personally, inevitably consult with Islamic economy activists, 
Islamic economists, and Islamic religious scholars. The relationship was continuously 
maintained. Throughout the development of Islamic banking-related policies in BI, BI 
always involved activists, Islamic economist, Islamic religious scholars, and (after the 
industry grew) Islamic bank bankers.
Around the time when BI started to have a specific team dealing with Islamic banking 
in 1998, BI also formed the Expert Committee for Islamic Banking Development, which 
was chaired by KH Alie Yafie of MUI and Syafi'i Antonio, an Islamic economist, as the 
secretary. In 2004, BI sponsored the establishment of PKES, which bridge the 
communication between various stakeholders of Islamic economy project. Subarjo 
Joyosumarto then acted as the chairman. When BI formed Islamic Banking Committee in 
2008, it also invited Islamic economy activists, Islamic economists, and religious scholars.
In the other hand, Islamic economy activists are also intentionally maintaining close 
relationship with the BI. When the Society for Islamic Economy was founded by Islamic 
economy movement activists in 2001, some BI officials were invited to sit in the central 
board. Muliaman Hadad, currently a Deputy Governor in BI, is currently acting as the 
Chairman of MES (from 2008 until 2011 and re-elected for 2011 until 2014).
6.  The Twin Negotiations: The Place of Islamic Banking and Finance in 
the State and the Place of State in the Islamic Banking and Finance
BI’s active role in supporting the growth of Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia 
is a fundamental factor in the development of Islamic economy project. However, BI’s deep 
involvement inevitably brought forward a dilemma about the relationship between the 
state and this particular Islamic economy project, which can be identified as two parallel 
continuous negotiations.
The first negotiation is on the place of Islamic banking and finance in the state. The 
original goal of Islamic economy movement is the islamization of the economic system of 
the state. Islamic banking and finance is an important part of this long term project. In the 
Picture 1. Total Football Approach of Islamic Banking Development 60)
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other hand, BI sees Islamic banking as an instrument to “provide a wider banking services 
alternative” which is compliant to the existing Indonesian banking architecture.62）  Islamic 
banking, in the view of BI, is not to replace the existing banking system, but instead to 
strengthen it.
Interestingly, given the abstract nature of this negotiation, both Islamic economy 
movement activists and BI official often tend to avoid discussing this openly. BI officials do 
not ask MES or other Islamic economy movement organizations to stop criticizing the 
current economic system or to change their ideological vision of changing the economic 
system. On the other hand, Islamic economy movement activists do not ask BI to support 
Islamic banking as a part of a total Islamization of the economic system, because they 
know that it would be impossible. Both prefer to discuss more practical matters in 
developing Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia.
Nevertheless, the interaction between the state institution (BI) and Islamic economy 
activists did affect both sides. Some Islamic economy activists are becoming more and more 
moderate due to their intensive interaction with BI and various other actors such as 
business actors. Some started to think that ‘coexistence’ with the existing economic system 
is not a bad thing. Some of them see that the way to an Islamic economic system is a long 
way, and thus need the journey should be conducted step by step, including by 
compromising with the state. In the other hand, some BI officials were becoming more 
supportive towards Islamic economy movement. However, these different positions were 
often swept under the carpet. Rather than discussing something that is too far away and 
resulted in nothing but disagreement, both BI and Islamic economy activists focus on 
practical things that they can agree upon.
The second negotiation is the opposite direction: the place of the state within Islamic 
banking and finance industry. How far should the state (BI) involved? What authorities 
should be in the hand of the market and what should be in the hand of the state? BI has a 
stake in this negotiation because it will affect the overall stability of the banking system.
Although a specific debate on this question was never formally held, many incidents 
were illustrating this negotiation. For instance, after BI sponsored the birth of Bank 
Syariah Mandiri and several other Islamic commercial banks were established, the new 
Islamic bank was ‘directed’ to establish another organization rather than unified in the 
existing Indonesian Association for Islamic Banks (Asosiasi Bank Syariah se-Indonesia, 
ASBISINDO) which was founded in 1992. Finally, BSM founded Islamic Banking 
Compartment within the Indonesian Banks Association (Kompartemen Perbankan Syariah 
PERBANAS). While there were some little disappointments within ASBISINDO, both 
organizations went along well with relatively no conflict.63）
Another case was the debate on the Islamic Banking Committee (KPS, Komite 
Perbankan Syariah). During the legislation process of the 2008 Islamic Bank Law, BI 
wanted to establish Islamic banking committee (KPS) within the BI structure with 
significant power to regulate the Islamic banking industry. In the KPS, BI promised to 
fairly accomodate representatives from the business, Islamic religious scholars, and Islamic 
economists.
This idea was not completely accepted by business actors due to their worries that the 
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BI will have stronger control to the industry and thus limiting its growth. MUI was also 
not really fond of the idea because it worried that the KPS will take over their role (for 
example: to issue fatwa regarding Islamic banking practices).64）
Finally, the KPS was established under BI structure, but with an unclear role, more 
like an advisory board, and not as powerful as it was designed. The power to issue fatwa 
stayed in DSN MUI (Dewan Syariah Nasional Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesia Islamic 
Scholars Council’s National Council of Shari’a). However, because MUI is not a state body, 
it has no legal power. Thus, as before, the fatwa only serve as an accepted agreement 
among the actors and only become a legal rule after BI issued a BI regulation (Peraturan 
Bank Indonesia) based on that particular fatwa. Of course, theoretically, BI can prefer to 
skip any fatwa that it does not agree to be legalized as PBI.65）  Due to its unclear position, 
KPS only existed in 2008 until 2010.
The KPS issue was only a part of BI’s concern on the governance of Islamic banking 
and how far the state should interfere. Some officials in the BI still found that the current 
governance of Islamic banking industry is a little bit problematic. Formally, the guideline 
for the industry was set by BI through BI regulations (PBI). Most PBI came from fatwa by 
DSN-MUI, which have more authority due to their vast religious knowledge.
However, according to personal opinions of some BI officials, the process is a 
problematic one. The process of an issuance of fatwa is started when an institution, usually 
Islamic banks or other business institutions, formally submit a request for a fatwa to DSN-
MUI, usually about the permissibility of a particular business practice. Following the 
request, DSN-MUI then will conduct meetings and discussions to discuss the matter. All 
costs for the discussion process to issue fatwa were beared by the institution that had 
requested the fatwa. While DSN-MUI members and Islamic banks always insist that DSN-
MUI is independent when making fatwa, some were worried that the process is unhealthy. 
Even though not criticizing it openly, some BI officials personally think that in current 
process there are many conflicts of interests. Even though the requester does not influence 
the fatwa making process, it pays for the cost of the process. Furthermore, many of DSN-
MUI members are also sitting as a member of Shari’a Supervisor Board in many Islamic 
banks, which was paid by the banks.66）
7. The Moderating Effect of BI’s Involvement
Prominent involvement of state institutions in the development of Islamic economy 
project had profoundly affected Islamic economy movement. By taking the leadership role 
in directing the development of Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia, added with the 
impact from the role of business actors, Bank Indonesia had created a moderating effect to 
the movement.
BI’s official website stated:
“The Islamic banking system envisioned by Bank Indonesia is a modern Islamic 
banking with open and universal characteristics and inclusive to all Indonesian people 
with no exception. It refers to banking system presenting applicative forms of Islamic 
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economic concept that is wisely formulated in the current context of problems faced by 
Indonesia within the consciousness of the historical socio-cultural condition of this 
country. Only by doing that, the aspiration development of Islamic banking will always 
be recognized and accepted by all Indonesian people as a part of the solutions to the 
various problems encountered by this country.”67）
One instance of this moderating role of BI was BI’s invitation to MarkPlus Inc., a 
professional marketing company, to help designing the grand strategy for Islamic banking 
market development. What is interesting is that the company was owned by Hermawan 
Kartajaya, a marketing expert with Chinese-Catholic background.68）  Furthermore, he was 
appointed to sit as the member of the Islamic Banking Committee from 2008 to 2010. 
Interestingly, there was no opposition or critics from Islamic economy activists.
This development is significant because during its early period, Indonesia’s economy 
movement was colored by a strong protest against Chinese domination in the economy. 
Even until late 1990s, this sentiment was still strong. For example, Agus Wahid, a staff at 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia, was criticized that Chinese-Indonesians were controlling at 
least 60% of Indonesia’s economy and argued that Islamic economy is the way to end this 
unfair domination and strengthen the Muslims economic power.69）  The activists ’ 
acceptance to Hermawan Kartajaya’s appointment as a member of KPS and his role in 
designing a more inclusive Islamic banking marked a significant departure of Islamic 
economy movement from its past political context.
Another factor that contributed to this moderating effect was BI’s role in connecting 
Indonesia’s Islamic economy project with the global Islamic economy industry. In its early 
period, Indonesia’s Islamic economy movement was pretty much isolated because of its 
limited resource. When BI started to be actively involved in the development of Islamic 
banking and finance, BI connected Indonesia’s Islamic economy industry with various 
international organizations such as Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic and Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), and International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM).70）  These 
organizations are having more professional orientation rather than political one (‘making 
bucks rather than changing the system’). Furthermore, BI also open Indonesia’s Islamic 
banking market to international business actors such as HSBC Amanah or CIMB, which 
conduct Islamic banking as a real business rather than as an idealist project to Islamize 
the economy.
8. Conclusion
In conclusion, BI’s support to the development of Islamic banking in Indonesia was not 
ideologically driven. There is in no way that BI embraced Islamic economy movement’s 
idea of Islamization of the economic system. Instead, BI supported the development of 
Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia because BI see its benefit for BI’s institutional 
objective, which is “to achieve and maintain the stability of the Rupiah value,” which is 
related to monetary policies, payment system, and banking system.
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In coming to this positive view, the role of certain individuals such as Subarjo 
Joyosumarto, Harisman, and Ramzi Zuhdi were important. Most of these officials were 
involved in the establishment of Indonesia’s first Islamic bank in 1991 and maintained 
close relationship with Islamic economy movement activists since then.
BI was very open in working together with Islamic economy movement activists who 
advocate for the Islamization of the economic system. However, despite the convergence of 
interests, there was also continuing tensions. These continuing tensions could be identified 
as ‘the twin negotiations,’ in which the state and Islamic economy movement negotiate the 
role of the state in the Islamic banking and finance (i.e. how far BI could interfere in the 
industry?) and the role of the Islamic banking and finance in Indonesia’s economic system 
(i.e. replacing the existing system vs. complementing the existing system).
The leading role of BI in shaping the Islamic banking and finance industry had 
created a moderating effect towards Islamic economy movement. Originally was calling of a 
total Islamization of the banking system, many supporters of Islamic economy project 
started to talk about ‘coexistence’ with the existing banking and financial system.
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このような見解の背景には、Subarjo Joyosumarto, Harisman, 及び Ramzi Zuhdiは重要
な役割を担ってきた。彼らは 1991年に、インドネシアで最初のイスラム銀行の設立に関わっ
たのみならず、それ以来イスラム経済の学者や活動家と密接な関係を維持してきた。
イスラム銀行及びイスラム金融業の形成における BIの主導的な役割はイスラム経済支持
者の動きに対して「緩和効果」をもたらしたと見られる。以前、多くのイスラム経済プロジェ
クトの支持者は銀行と金融制度の完全なイスラム化を求めたが、近年、既存の銀行・金融制度
との共存の可能性も議論するようになった。
（コイルッザド・ソフワン・アル・バナ，立命館大学大学院国際関係研究科博士課程後期課程）
